Banking conditions in the 12th District: Has the recovery taken hold? by Wally Young
O
n September 20, 2010 the National Bureau 
of Economic Research announced that the 
longest  and  deepest  recession  since  the 
Great  Depression  officially  ended  in  June 
2009. Yet, here we are more than a year later and many 
banks throughout the nation are still struggling mightily to 
recover from this downturn. This is even more pronounced 
in the 12th Federal Reserve District (comprised of Alaska, 
Arizona,  California,  Hawaii,  Idaho,  Nevada,  Oregon, 
Utah, and Washington) where 42 banks and thrifts failed 
in 2008 and 2009, and another 31 banks have failed so 
far in 2010. Why has this recession had such a profound 
impact on banking conditions in the 12th District? In this 
article, we’ll address some of the issues that contributed to 
the still-prevalent banking crisis, discuss some emerging 
signs of improving banking conditions, and consider the 
headwinds that the banking industry will continue to face 
as it mounts its recovery. 
12th District Profile
Currently,  roughly  520  banks  are  headquartered 
within the 12th District. A vast majority of these banks 
(83 percent) are small, community banks with total assets 
of less than $1 billion. Over the last two decades, the 
loan  portfolios  of  these  community  banks  in  particular 
have become less diversified as they focused on certain 
niches that enabled them to effectively compete against 
credit unions and large banking organizations. Community 
banks  found  their  competitive  advantage  in  commercial 
real  estate  (CRE)  financing,  which  includes  funding  the 
acquisition of income producing properties such as office 
buildings, retail centers, and apartment buildings, as well as 
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25 Community Investments, Winter 2010/11 – Volume 22, Issue 3funding the acquisition of land for future development and 
the construction of residential and commercial buildings. 
With appropriate risk management practices in place, 
CRE  lending  itself  is  not  a  concern,  especially  when 
market conditions are benign. However, ever increasing 
concentrations of CRE loans do pose a risk to financial 
institutions  when  market  conditions  turn.  Historically, 
commercial property values are more sensitive to adverse 
economic and real estate market conditions because the 
value of these properties are in large part driven by rents, 
vacancy rates, and the investor’s rate of return expecta-
tions. In an economic downturn, it is inevitable that rents 
decline,  vacancy  rates  increase,  and  rate  of  return  ex-
pectations rise. Combined, these factors place significant 
downward pressure on property values and borrower re-
payment capacity. More importantly, land values (which 
typically generate no income until development and con-
struction is complete) also often fall dramatically when 
economic conditions weaken, as demand for future devel-
opment quickly stalls. 
The increase in CRE lending in the 12th District is also 
the direct result of the strong growth that many parts of the 
District have experienced in recent years. Areas like Las 
Vegas, Phoenix, the Inland Empire of Southern California, 
and many others, were experiencing strong growth that 
was largely financed by community banks. Both residen-
tial and commercial property values in these markets were 
far more exposed when the downturn hit, as the pipe-
line of new and pending construction quickly outpaced 
waning demand. Over a very short timeframe, property 
values plummeted, as did the financial strength of the real 
estate developers and investors. 
Rising CRE Concentrations
Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which CRE concen-
trations have increased since 1991 for all banks nation-
wide and those within the 12th District. Note that in the 
12th  District,  before  abating  somewhat  in  2010,  total 
CRE peaked at over 400 percent of Risk Based Capital in 
2009.1 This was close to double the nationwide concen-
tration, which was around 225 percent at the same time. 
Meanwhile, the overall levels of CRE lending are notably 
higher than they were in 1991. 
We observe a similar trend in loans to finance Construc-
tion & Land Development (C&LD). Beginning in the mid-
1990s, the concentration of C&LD loans in the 12th District 
increased from less than 50 percent of Risk Based Capital, 
to approximately 120 percent in late 2007. However, as the 
real estate market crashed and the recession began in late 
2007, the concentration of C&LD loans dropped quickly; in 
the 12th District, the C&LD concentration has fallen back 
to a level last seen in 2000. Even more dramatic, the con-
centration of residential C&LD in the 12th District declined 
from just under 40 percent of risk based capital, to approxi-
mately 15 percent since late 2007. 
The declining CRE concentrations, and in particular 
the declining C&LD concentrations, are not the result of 
these loans being repaid. Instead, the declining concen-
trations are largely the result of banks charging-off and 
restructuring more of these loans. At the end of 2007, the 
Figure 1  Loan Concentration History
“. . . total CRE 
peaked at over 400 
percent of Risk Based 
Capital in 2009.”
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0.26 percent. This net charge off rate ballooned to 3.75 
percent by the end of 2008—the highest loss rate since 
1991. Then, in 2009 it swelled to 8.55 percent, and for the 
first six months of 2010, the net charge off rate remained 
high at an annualized 6.05 percent. The numbers are even 
more striking if we focus specifically on residential con-
struction loans.
These hefty losses on large volumes of CRE loans have 
directly led to declining profits for the banking industry, 
particularly for the banks located in the 12th District. The 
second quarter of 2010 marked the seventh consecutive 
quarter of negative Return on Average Assets (ROAA) for 
the 12th District. The average quarterly ROAA in the 12th 
District on June 30, 2010 was -0.11 percent. Further illus-
trating the disparate impact on smaller banks, the ROAA 
for community banks was -0.28 percent; for banks with 
total assets of $1 billion to $10 billion it was 0.08 percent, 
and for banks larger than $10 billion it was a relatively 
strong 0.99 percent. 
Some Signs of Stabilization
Despite  the  sizeable  losses  that  many  banks  in  the 
12th District incurred as a result of their significant con-
centrations of loans secured by CRE and more specifically, 
C&LD, there are some signs that banking conditions have 
stabilized  and  may  improve.  For  example,  the  volume 
of problem loans is beginning to recede, an increasing 
number of banks have returned to profitability, there are 
some signs of emerging loan growth, and an increasing 
number of banks have successfully raised capital in recent 
quarters. Consider the following trends: 
•  The total noncurrent loan rate (loans past due 90 days 
or on nonaccrual status) has been relatively flat over 
the last three quarters and has actually inched down in 
the latest quarter (see Figure 2). At June 30, 2010 the 
percentage of total noncurrent loans was 4.3 percent.
•  The noncurrent rate for C&LD loans dropped from 15.7 
percent in the first quarter of 2010 to 14.6 percent in 
the second quarter of 2010. This is still at a very high 
level, but it appears to have peaked. 
•  In the last quarter of 2009, 54 percent of 12th Dis-
trict banks lost money. In the first quarter of 2010, this 
percentage fell to 38 percent; it then fell again to 37 
percent in the second quarter.
•  Although the annual loan growth in the District is still 
negative, some loan segments are now showing posi-
tive loan growth. Of note, loans secured by apartment 
buildings  are  increasing  at  an  eight  percent  annual 
rate. Credit card loans are increasing at a five percent 
annual rate. 
•  At June 30, 2010, almost 10 percent of 12th District 
banks  successfully  raised  capital  over  the  prior  12 
month period. This is up from 7.7 percent at mid-year 
2009 and 6.6 percent at mid-year 2008. Meanwhile, 
capital ratios are improving in the District. 
These are just a few of many positive developments 
noted  in  the  June  30,  2010  data.  However,  improv-
ing trends need to be kept in perspective. Although we 
see signs of improving profitability, it is still negative on 
* Aggregate data for all District commercial banks with <$50B in loans
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 12th District Banking Profile, September 2010
Figure 2  District Noncurrent Loan Ratio Edging Downward
12th District Bank Noncurrent Loan Ratio (Aggregate*)
“In the last quarter of 
2009, 54 percent of 12th 
District banks lost money. 
In the first quarter of 
2010, this percentage fell 
to 38 percent; it then fell 
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starting to decrease, the level still remains extremely high 
and although capital ratios have improved, they still need 
to improve further. Moreover, as addressed in the next 
section, there are headwinds facing the industry that could 
reverse some of these positive trends, or more likely, make 
the recovery in banking conditions a long and slow one. 
The Headwinds
Although we may have technically exited the reces-
sion in mid-2009, the economy has clearly not yet fully 
recovered. Until the economy gains strength, it will be dif-
ficult for the banking industry to fully recover. Many of the 
factors that are now impeding the economic recovery also 
contribute to the uncertain banking environment. These 
so-called headwinds make it difficult for us to conclude 
that banking conditions have definitely turned the corner. 
At the very least, these headwinds strongly suggest that it 
will be some time before the banking industry is back at 
full strength. 
The first headwind is low job growth and high unem-
ployment. Without a substantial uptick in hiring, consum-
ers and businesses will continue to hold back on spend-
ing. Consumers do not spend money if they are out of 
work or fear that they may soon be. Also, in the face of 
unemployment and reduced income, borrowers are less 
able to repay any loans that they may already have. 
A  second  challenge  is  that  consumer  confidence 
remains weak. Consumer confidence will improve as un-
employment falls, but consumers continue to worry about 
their  housing  situations  and  their  own  balance  sheets. 
Even with improving job prospects, consumers may still 
be slow to spend until they feel they have appropriately 
replenished their own net worth. 
Third, there is still a great amount of corporate un-
certainty. Corporations are slow to expand operations in 
periods  of  uncertainty.  Political  issues,  tax  issues,  con-
sumer confidence, and the changing regulatory environ-
ment together create a cloud of uncertainty. Even when 
this cloud clears, it may be some time before businesses 
actually need credit because corporate balance sheets are 
now flush with cash.
A fourth headwind is the significant volume of resi-
dential mortgage loans that is still working its way through 
the  foreclosure  pipeline.  Even  as  housing  conditions 
improve (albeit gradually), home prices will continue to 
face downward pressure as an ever increasing number 
of distressed properties are put on the market. It will be 
some time before the market fully absorbs this inventory 
and home prices begin to show any notable improvement. 
The current moratorium on foreclosures by some banks—
prompted by concerns over their foreclosure processing 
systems—may also affect the housing recovery. 
The Outlook
Given these headwinds, the outlook for banking con-
ditions  remains  uncertain. There  is  strong  evidence  to 
suggest that the industry has turned the corner and that the 
worst is behind us. Nevertheless, the industry is still facing 
significant challenges. Community banks in particular are 
still struggling to recover from losses in their CRE port-
folios, and although capital is improving throughout the 
District, banks will need to continue to strengthen their 
capital positions as problem loans remain high and signifi-
cant uncertainties remain. 
In the coming quarters, we will likely see incremen-
tal improvement in banking conditions at the community 
bank level and continued profitability at the larger institu-
tions. However, until there is more clarity around the head-
winds noted above and other uncertainties affecting the 
industry, it is more than likely that it will be well into 2011 
before the banking industry is back on sound footing. 
If  you’re  interested  in  learning  more  about  banking 
conditions in the 12th District, you can find additional 
reports by the Division of Banking Supervision and Regu-
lation  on  their  website  at  http://www.frbsf.org/publica-
tions/banking/index.html. 
Wally Young is Senior Manager in the Risk, Monitoring 
& Analysis Department of the Banking Supervision and 
Regulation Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco.     
Figure 3  The Headwinds
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